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The book under review is a compilation of the author's articles and lectures
that highlight the prominent developments in the literature on the subject of Islamic
banking and inform the reader of the current state of debate on it. One of the
earliest and main contributors to this topic is the author himself. The focus of this
review will mainly be on "Economics of Profit-Sharing", which is the title of the
fourth chapter of the book and is among his latest contributions. This chapter is
a significant contribution as it is the first attempt to formalise the concept of profit-
sharing into an analytical model and, therefore, demands closer scrutiny. However,
in the remaining chapters of the book, the author has drawn attention to some of
the fine points made in the literature on this topic. Since some of these points
appear to be controversial to me, I will briefly discuss them before moving on to the
analytical chapter of the book.
The author claims that Islamic economists have scored a valid point by
"demonstrating" that Zakat will discourage hoarding (p. 18). That this claim is
justified is not clear, particularly because hoardmg is not even defmed. In economics
hoarding is money which is kept out of circulation, like the proverbial money that is
hidden under the blanket. The author's contention would only be true if these
hoarded funds were deposited after Zakat was instituted on bank accounts, so that
their social contribution towards welfare was being fulft1led. In fact, individualswith
such a heightened social conscience would pay Zakat voluntarily anyway rather
than being motivated by the instituting of Zakat to draw funds out of hoarding and
into bank accounts, i.e. bring more funds into circulation in order to pay Zakat.
On the other hand, if Zakat is applied to bank deposits, then hoarding in the
sense defined above may well increase. Since, administratively, there is no easy way
to identify these funds, it is not easily possible to subject them to Zakat. If
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hoarding is defmed as funds in savingaccounts as opposed to investment or profit-
sharing accounts, then Zakat may effect a reallocation of funds in favour of profit-
sharing accounts. In fact, Zakat in saving accounts, in conjunction with the
elimination of a risk-free savingoption, could well induce purchase of jewellery or
land or induce conspicuous consumption. In the last case inflationary forces in an
economy would be exacerbated, depending on the state of real capital formation and
supply-side bottlenecks.
The author argues that concentration of power resides with banks because
power results from the possession of "abstract capital", and banks presumably have
the inherent capacity to concentrate liquid wealth in their hands (p. 83). This
ducks the issue of the economic power that results from the ownership of productive
assets. In fact, this omission coincides with the marked failure of Islamic economists
to deal in an operational manner with the division of surplus within the firm. The
focus has been exclusively on the division of surplus between the entrepreneurs
(borrowers), financial intermediaries, and depositors (lenders).
The author also attests the widely held belief among Islamic economists that
saving is unlikely to be affected by a change from interest-based transactions to
profit-sharing (p.93). The Keynesian idea of saving being largely a function of
income is. used to support this argument. Modem macroeconomic theory has
considerably refined the Keynesian consumption function, and the impact of interest
rate on consumption and, hence, saving through the asset-effect is now a part of
standard theory. Apart from this indirect positive relationship of interest rate and
saving, refutation of the direct positive relationship between them can only be based
on an extensive survey of empirical literature on this issue in a particular develop-
mental context.
Dr. Siddiqui has also brought together severalarguments that are often used to
indicate the strength of the profit-sharing fmancial system in contrast with an
interest-based one. He correctly points out that there would be a reallocation of
wealth from the rentier to the entrepreneurial class (p. 73). Also, where a fixed
return is guaranteed, the banks may choose to favour the more credit-worthy who
may also be the more influential. In a profit-sharing arrangement, the bank will have
to consider the profit forgone when choosing to advance a loan to an influential client
rather than to one whose project indicates a greater expected return. Another point
made is that interest as a fixed, predetermined return is included in the cost of
production, and under competitive conditions this would entail a lower level of
production. Given a significant degree of market concentration, it would also imply
a higher price. As to the charge that banks will understate profits to the depositors,
the author believes that pure competition among banks would eliminate this danger
(p. 64). The danger that firms would understate profits to the banks will similarly
be reduced in a competitive environment where firms compete for loans, and where
their track record would determine their future loan procurements. Nevertheless,
there is a great danger that someone may default on a large loan due to questionable
personal ethics.
In fact, it is on this point that I find severalIslamic eoncomists, including
Dr. Siddiqui, to be at fault methodologically. He assumes that the Islamic spirit
would call for cooperation among economic agents for the achievement of common
goals (p. 98). Both the entrepreneur and the lender would want to see a higher
profit, but the entrepreneur will clearly have an incentive to retain as much as
possible of these profits. It is methodologically incorrect to assume behavioural
postulates which in fact have to be empirically verified. In other words, it is un-
acceptable to rely for the success of institutional reform on behavioural postulates
like altruism or co-operation, whose implicit presence in averagesocial behaviour has
not been empirically verified. What is at issue here is the fundamental institutional
change in Muslim societies as they exist now, and not in idealised Islamic societies
where most institutional change may well be redundant. The author is certainly
within his rights to work within certain specified value and institutional parameters.
However, these premises need to be explicitly stated. If they are, the model may
then have less contemporary relevance although it may perhaps be a useful exercise
in itself.
In the fourth chapter of the book the author has developed a practical
operational model of profit-sharing which is suggestedas the route towards establish-
ing an interest-free financial system. The rest of this reviewis devoted to comments
on this model.
The model presented is a partial-equilibrium comparative static model that is
intended to determine the shares of the three parties to a profit-sharing contract.
One set of demand and supply curves for loanable funds (in profit-share/investment
space) is illustrated as determining shares between the banks and the lenders and
another set between the banks and the borrowers. In neither case are the demand
and supply curves carefully modelled or derived but are merely presented as a logical
inevitability. This is not a defensible position. For example, the demand curve for
borrowers is in effect an investment schedule underlying which is an extremely
complex theory of business investment behaviour. With regard to the demand curve,
as presented by the author (p. 104),it is not clear what causes some entrepreneurs
to invest earlier and others later when the borrowers' profit-share declines. Why
does everyone not wait? Once again, underlying the supply curve ofloanable funds
is the theory of portfolio management. Deriving the supply schedule formally is
possible, and the process yields some rich insights.
The author also makes some errors with regard to the comparative static frame-
work of the model. Expectations of borrowers and lenders are stated to be
identical and based on some function of past profits (p. 102). Since information
flows to borrowers and lenders are unlikely to be the same, these assumptions are
unrealistic. When the author does allow for differences in expectations, the source
of these differences is not explained.
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There are several other problems in the details of the analysis. The author
should introduce another variable (say, P') to represent expected profits. As the
analysis stands, a change in P represents movements along the curves and not a shift
in the curves. If this problem is taken care of, then there remains considerable
arbitrariness in the model which attempts to explain variation in profit shares in
response to a change in expected profits (pp. 106-107). The first arbitrary element
in the model is the assertion that the supply for loanable funds will shift less than the
demand for loanable funds. There is no reason why this should always be the case.
The second arbitrary element is the bank's refraining from matching the entrepre-
neurs increase in funds by a corresponding increase. Since they both have the same
expectations there is no justification for such behaviour. In fact, the author's analysis
indicates (p. 106) that the banks would have no incentive for doing this and that
they will manipulate the market (i.e. by restraining their demand for funds to be less
than the increased demand of entrepreneurs) to ensure a greater profit-share for
themselves. In other words we don't have a model of a free and competitive fmancial
market that has the ability to explain the variation in profit-shares.
In the comparative statics of the model, profits are implicitly assumed to be
independent of the level of investment. This assumption is not warranted and the in-
ability to allow for the feedback effect is alimitation of the partial-equilibrium frame-
work. Nonetheless, the existence of the feedback should be recognised and the prob-
able direction of the movement towards a new equilibrium indicated.
Perhaps the most serious error relates to the recommendation in this frame-
work for monetary policy. Having allegedly arrived at the market-determined
profit-shares, the author is quite willing to relegate them as a tool of monetary policy.
If profit-shares reflect the realities of the saving and production process, changing
them at will to suit the requirements of monetary policy will clearly lead to a
misallocation of resources.
Since the primary objection to a conventional financial system is ethical, any
advantages or disadvantages it may have in an economic realm would in the final
analysis not count for the reformer. However, the trade-offs do need to be accurate-
ly appraised to help in instituting a workable alternative option to the interest-
based one.
I have two fmal objections. First, the author insists that profit-sharing and not
PLS (profit-and-loss-sharing)is the appropriate concept (p. 135). I do not fmd the
argument convincing, based as it is on a distinction between accounting and real
losses. Surely an economist's concern should be with real losses, and the
entrepreneur does stand to lose the return on his time and effort in the PLS contract.
Second, the author has taken it for granted throughout the whole book that an
overall change from interest-based transactions to ones without interest (in this case
profit-sharing) is the only social option. The current practice in the Middle-Eastern
countries is to have profit-sharing banking as an option along with conventional
banking. To me, spiritual merit appears to be greater in a voluntary choice of the
interest.free option than in having it as the only choice under compulsion. I would
not dispute that the provision of such an option should be the duty of all states that
represent Muslims.
The latter objection brings to the fore the importance of viewingthis work in
the larger context of initiating an Islamic economic system. Even if the analysiswas
made more spohisticated along the lines suggested in the body of this review, it
would do no more than yield more useful insights into the workings of the fmancial
system based on PLS. This leaves the major issuesunaddressed.
First, what is to be the basis of a transition of a community to an Islamic
footing? One of the minimum conditions for this must be the expression of mass
sentiment for such a change, and a full and active mass participation in the revolu.
tionary process that it entails. Secondly, the fervour for such change could be
viewed as prompted by a will to create a more just society for all, and one which
allows Muslims to live in concordance with their fundamental beliefs. It is not
necessary to assume that the process of social change will entail a moral revolution
that will once and for all transform social behaviour into a more altruistic one,
thereby bringing a just society into existence. To do so is neither realistic nor
warranted by the Islamic dialectical view of human nature.
To transform society for attaining social justice, or the Islamic concept of
al-'Adl, the rules would have to be radically altered so that social agents and insti-
tutions are no longer able to thrive on exploitation. For a start, such change would
entail elimination of riba in all its manifest form (apart from interest) such as
monopoly rents, hoarding, and absentee rents. This process would take more than
marginal tinkering with the existing capitalist system, even though it would not
necessarily rule out decision-makingby the market-process.
Despite his prominence in the field of Islamiceconomics, Dr. Siddiqui is among
a majority who seem to have, perhaps inadvertently, created a misconception about
the basis and nature of the social change needed to bring about an Islamic system.
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